RUBLE-STABLECOIN WHALE: A7A5 MOVES $9.3 BILLION VIA “GRINEX” IN 120 DAYS—IS GARANTEX BACK FROM THE DEAD?

A7A5, a rouble-pegged stablecoin launched this year in Kyrgyzstan, has processed ≈ $9 bn in cross-border transfers despite a market cap under $200 mn. Investigators link the token and its sole major venue, Grinex, to Promsvyazbank (PSB)—a Russian defence bank under US/EU/UK sanctions—and to fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Șor. Evidence suggests Grinex is a thinly veiled re-brand of the sanctioned Russian exchange Garantex, raising major red-flag risk for financial institutions and regulators.

🔑 KEY POINTS

• $9.3 bn in four months: On-chain data shows A7A5 volumes dwarf token supply, hinting at internal treasury maneuvers or wash trades (Source: ft.com).
• Launched Feb 2025, Bishkek: Issuer Old Vector registered in Kyrgyzstan alongside shell entities at a residential address (Source: trmlabs.com, info-res.org).
• Backing by PSB: Collateral held at Promsvyazbank, a Russian state “war-bank” sanctioned by US, EU, UK since 2022 (Source: ft.com).
• Suspected Garantex successor: Wallet overlap, identical UI, and Telegram migration campaigns tie Grinex to the shuttered exchange (Source: trmlabs.com, merklescience.com).
• Ilan Șor fingerprints: Moldovan-sanctioned oligarch controls parent A7 Group; digital infrastructure overlaps with prior influence ops (Source: info-res.org)
• 82 % of sanctioned volumes: Garantex previously accounted for the bulk of illicit crypto tied to sanctioned actors; patterns persist on Grinex (Source: trmlabs.com)
• Moscow-time trading rhythm & repetitive TxIDs: Suggest centralized book-entry process rather than organic market flow (Source: ft.com).

SHORT NARRATIVE

On 25 June 2025 the Financial Times revealed that the rouble-pegged stablecoin A7A5 has already routed ≈ $9.3 billion through Grinex, a Kyrgyz-registered crypto exchange. A7A5 advertises full backing by rouble deposits held at Promsvyazbank (PSB)—a bank designated by OFAC, the EU and the UK for servicing Russia’s defence sector. Blockchain forensics show large, repetitive transfers between a handful of wallets, mostly during Moscow business hours, mirroring internal ledger movements once seen at the sanctioned exchange Garantex. Telegram channels formerly operated by Garantex now steer users to Grinex, framing A7A5 as a tool to “unfreeze” blocked balances.

Go to the Grinex profile on RatEx42.

EXTENDED ANALYSIS

Legal / Sanctions Exposure

• Primary risk: PSB’s role means A7A5 constitutes “property or interests in property” of a Specially Designated National under US rules, exposing transactors—even indirect ones—to secondary sanctions.
• Kyrgyz nexus: While Kyrgyzstan has no equivalent sanctions, its FIU is treaty-bound to share data with the Eurasian Group on Money-Laundering (EAG). Use of local correspondent banks to custody PSB funds may breach UN Security Council Resolution 2375 (counter-proliferation financing).

Regulatory Gaps

• Stablecoin regime-shopping: Kyrgyz law treats stablecoins as “digital assets” with minimal reserve-audit obligations—allowing PSB exposure to hide behind nominal local oversight.
• Travel-rule blind spot: Transfers between A7A5 (TRON) and USDT occur wholly inside Grinex hot-wallet clusters, bypassing mandated originator/beneficiary data sharing.

Operational Red Flags

ACTIONABLE INSIGHT

Compliance teams should blocklist Grinex deposit addresses and monitor for A7A5 contract interactions on TRON/Ethereum. Flag any customer converting rubles to USDT via OTC desks quoting A7A5. Consider filing SARs/STRs citing potential sanctions evasion and political-influence financing.

📣 CALL FOR INFORMATION

RatEx42 invites regulators, journalists, and blockchain investigators to share:

1. New wallet clusters linked to A7A5 or Grinex.
2. Fiat on-/off-ramp details involving PSB or Kyrgyz intermediaries.
3. Evidence of A7A5-funded political advertising or vote-buying operations.

Submit securely via our whistleblower platform, Whistle42.